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A transition is starting throughout the nation as renewable 
energy resources are developed and older fossil-fuel facilities 
retire.1 The communities that bear the brunt of fossil-fuel 
pollution will also likely bear this transition’s economic 
impacts. Yet, there is no guarantee that these communities will 
share in the transition’s economic benefits—in particular, the 
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 1. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS    
2–22 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/
ar4_syr_spm.pdf (“This . . . [r]eport is based on the assessment carried out by 
the three Working Groups of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC).”). 
506 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:1 
 
building, operation, and ownership of new renewable energy 
resources. Renewable energy laws generally do not consider 
these types of impacts when determining where to site new 
resources.2 
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), in a 
case involving Native Americans in Arizona affected by the 
operations and closure of a recently retired coal-fired power 
plant, developed a novel plan to generate a revenue stream 
from a closed power plant to assist an impacted community 
with a transition to renewable energy.3 The CPUC’s decision 
provides an important roadmap for other states to consider 
communities impacted by the operation and closure of fossil-
fuel facilities as the energy grid transitions into green 
resources.  
I. CONCEPT OF JUST TRANSITION TO A                 
GREEN ECONOMY 
Scientists have found that significant greenhouse gas 
reductions would be necessary to avoid the likely devastating 
impacts of climate change.4 Reputable scientists have also 
found that the Earth is nearing a tipping point where climate 
change will be irreversible.5 These impacts are already 
occurring.6 Recent years were among the warmest on record, 
and studies continue to link climate change to extreme weather 
events.7 
                                                          
 2. See id. at 14–18. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra 
note 1, at 7–8, 18–20. 
 5. Id. at 13–14; see James Hansen et al., Target CO2: Where Should 
Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 225–26 (2008); see also 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON 
MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE 
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTION: FACT SHEET (2011), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and_events/docs/srex/SREX_fact_sheet.pdf 
(discussing the likely changes in extreme events). 
 6. See NOAA Says 2010 Among Warmest on Record; Pew Links Climate, 
Harsh Weather Frequency, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 125, at A-14 (June 29, 
2011). 
 7. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he existence of the link between climate change and 
extreme weather is not so much theoretical anymore as it is observational.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. BULLETIN OF THE AM. 
METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y, STATE OF THE CLIMATE IN 2010, SPECIAL 
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To mitigate future impacts, federal, state, and local 
governments are evaluating options to reduce greenhouse 
gases.8 Many efforts focus on the electrical generation industry 
since generating electricity from fossil fuels creates 
approximately forty percent of the United States’ carbon 
dioxide emissions.9 To reduce electricity’s greenhouse gas 
levels, reduction plans require increased electricity generation 
through renewable, less-polluting resources, or resource 
conservation.10 Increased development of renewable energy and 
energy efficiency measures can mitigate climate change 
impacts and help communities transition away from fossil fuel 
dependence.11 
A significant barrier to transitioning to clean energy 
sources is the local economic dependency fostered by a fossil 
fuel economy.12 Many communities remain financially 
                                                          
SUPPLEMENT TO THE BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY, 
VOL. 92, NO. 6, JUNE 2011, at S16, S39–40 (J. Blunden et al. eds., 2011). 
 8. See PEW CTR. OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 101: 
STATE ACTION 1 (2011), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
climate101-state.pdf (“A wide range of policies have been adopted at the state 
and regional levels to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, [and] develop clean 
energy resources . . . .”). 
 9. See Electricity Explained: Electricity and the Environment—Basics, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/
index.cfm?page=electricity_environment (last updated Mar. 25, 2013) (“Power 
plants that burn fossil fuels and materials made from fossil fuels . . . are the 
sources of about 40% of the total U.S. carbon dioxide . . . emissions.”); see also 
World Carbon Emissions From Fossil Fuel Combustion Reach Record High, 
IEA Says, Daily Envt’l Rep. (BNA) No. 101, at A-2 (May 25, 2012) (discussing 
the increase of already high levels of “fossil fuel-related carbon dioxide 
emissions, mostly from power plants”). 
 10. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1, 
at 14–22. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Christa Marshall, ‘Coal Country’ Poses the Biggest Obstacle in 
Senate Climate Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
cwire/2009/11/02/02climatewire-coal-country-poses-the-biggest-obstacle-in-s-
79147.html?pagewanted=all (discussing how the majority of states are 
economically dependent on coal); see also INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, THE 
ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION IN THE POWER SECTOR 5, 6 (2010), available at 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/economics_of_
transition.pdf (discussing the general economics of transitioning away from 
fossil fuel generation); Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: 
Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1688–90 (2012) 
(outlining transitional considerations of a renewable energy transition). 
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dependent upon fossil fuels for their economic development.13 
These communities are often low-income communities of color 
that disproportionately bear the adverse environmental and 
health impacts from fossil fuel exploration, extraction, 
production, consumption, and disposal.14 Climate change 
resulting from fossil fuel burning will only increase cumulative 
environmental and health disparities.15 Communities that bear 
a disproportionate impact of environmental pollution also 
generally have a higher energy burden,16 which makes them 
more vulnerable to fluctuating energy prices17 and the expected 
increased energy needs due to climate change.18 
A transition to renewable energy could help revitalize 
these fossil-fuel dependent communities. Renewable energy 
and energy efficiency resources reduce the bills of the 
residences where they are installed, and green development 
                                                          
 13. See U.N. DIV. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE TRANSITION TO A GREEN 
ECONOMY: BENEFITS, CHALLENGES AND RISKS FROM A SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 9–15 (2012), available at 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/Green%20Economy_full%20repo
rt%20final%20for%20posting%20clean.pdf (describing the risks of 
transitioning to a green economy). 
 14. See MANUEL PASTOR ET AL., MINDING THE CLIMATE GAP: WHAT’S AT 
STAKE IF CALIFORNIA’S CLIMATE LAW ISN’T DONE RIGHT AND RIGHT AWAY     
8–12 (2010), available at http://dornsife.usc.edu/pere/documents/
mindingthegap.pdf; Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Evidence of Environmental 
Injustice, 12 ENVTL. L. NEWS 1, 3–5 (2003) (“To environmental justice 
proponents disproportionate burdens of environmental risk appeared to be 
borne by communities populated by people of color or of concentrated 
poverty.”); see also Air Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last 
updated Sept. 25, 2013) (“Fossil fuel-fired power plants are responsible for 67 
percent of the nation’s sulfur dioxide emissions, 23 percent of nitrogen oxide 
emissions, and 40 percent of man-made carbon dioxide emissions.”). 
 15. See PASTOR ET AL., supra note 14, at 15–17; Seth B. Shonkoff et al., 
Minding the Climate Gap: Environmental Health and Equity Implications of 
Climate Change Mitigation Policies in California, 2 ENVTL. JUST. 173, 173–75 
(2009). 
 16. Energy burden is defined as “the expenditures of the household for 
home energy divided by the income of the household.” 42 U.S.C. § 8622(2) 
(2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 17. The energy burden continues to grow as energy prices for heating oil, 
natural gas, electricity, and propane are rising. See CAMPAIGN FOR HOME 
ENERGY ASSISTANCE, THE LIHEAP INVESTMENT 1 (2010), available at 
http://liheap.org/assets/investment/LIHEAP_investment_june2010.pdf 
(discussing a program to provide assistance to low-income households to pay 
for heating and cooling their home). 
 18. See id. at 2 (showing the energy price increases). 
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could also create jobs in the community.19 Investment in green 
resources has been shown to create more jobs than investment 
in the fossil fuel resources.20 Development of renewable energy 
resources can also provide a revenue stream and income to 
communities.21 
II.  A CASE STUDY: THE MOHAVE GENERATING 
STATION AND ITS IMPACT ON NAVAJO                          
AND HOPI COMMUNITIES 
The case involving the Mohave Generating Station 
provides an example of how a transition from fossil fuel to 
renewables can be supported. The case demonstrates that 
finding a solution requires understanding each community’s 
history and opportunities. 
The Mohave Generating Station (Mohave) began 
operations in 1971.22 It was located in Laughlin, Nevada, along 
the Arizona border, and “approximately 75 miles southwest of 
the Grand Canyon.”23 The two-unit, 1580 megawatt (MW) coal-
fired power plant emitted up to 40,000 tons of sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) per year and was at one point the largest source of SO2 
emissions in the West.24 
Mohave was operated by Southern California Edison 
(SCE), which was its 56% majority owner.25 Its coal came by 
                                                          
 19. See, e.g., L.A. BUS. COUNCIL, MAKING A MARKET: MULTIFAMILY 
ROOFTOP SOLAR AND SOCIAL EQUITY IN LOS ANGELES 4, 5, 7 (2011), available 
at http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/242/docs/LABC-Exec-Summary-
Brochure.pdf (estimating that 4500 job years could be created with a 300 MW 
multi-family solar program). 
 20. See, e.g., ROBERT POLLIN ET AL., GREEN PROSPERITY: HOW CLEAN-
ENERGY POLICIES CAN FIGHT POVERTY AND RAISE LIVING STANDARDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2, 9–10 (2009), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/
fileadmin/pdf/other_publication_types/green_economics/green_prosperity/Gree
n_Prosperity.pdf. 
 21. See L.A. BUS. COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 6–7, 14–15. 
 22. Investigation on the Comm’n’s Own Motion of the Maint. & Operating 
Practices, Safety Standards & the Reasonableness of Costs Incurred from the 
Mohave Coal Plant Accident, Decision No. 94-03-048, 53 CPUC2d 452, 456, 
1994 Cal. PUC LEXIS 216, at *2 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 9, 1994) 
[hereinafter Mohave Coal Plant Accident]. 
 23. Final Project Mohave Report Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVT’L PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/mohave/mofact.html (last visited Oct. 
8, 2013). 
 24. Id. 
 25. In re S. Cal. Edison Co. Regarding the Distribution of SO2 Allowance 
Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of Mohave Generating 
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way of an usual 275-mile slurry line from the Black Mesa Coal 
Mine on the Hopi and Navajo Reservations in Arizona, 
operated by Peabody Western Coal Company and jointly owned 
by the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe.26 Groundwater from an 
aquifer under the Hopi and Navajo reservations, called the N-
aquifer, provided the water for the slurry line.27 
For decades, the Navajo and Hopi had little control over 
their coal and water resources.28 “Until 1938, the Department 
of the Interior had exclusive authority to lease to private 
companies the right to develop natural resources on Indian 
land, even over Tribes’ objections.”29 One commentator labeled 
these times “the nadir of Native existence on the continent” due 
to their loss of land, inactive Tribal governments, and inability 
to protect against further encroachments from the outside.30 
In 1938, under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA), the 
Tribes obtained the right to negotiate their mineral rights 
subject to the Secretary of Interior’s oversight.31 “Nevertheless, 
the IMLA did little to prevent private companies from 
exploiting Tribes’ weak bargaining position, which resulted 
from their dire economic circumstances and their lack of 
adequate representation, among other factors.”32 
With this backdrop, a long history of the Hopi and Navajo 
struggle to gain control over and the full value of their 
                                                          
Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Decision Determining Treatment of Sale 
Proceeds of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances from Mohave Generating Station, 
Decision No. 13-02-004, 2013 Cal. PUC LEXIS 69, at *13 (Cal. Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n Feb. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Mohave Sulfur Allowances]. It was also 
owned by the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (10% share), 
Nevada Power Company (14% share), and the Salt River Project (20% share). 
Id. at *13 n.11. 
 26. Id.; Opinion Authorizing S. Cal. Edison Co. to Make Necessary & 
Appropriate Expenditures on Critical Path Investments at Mohave While 
Continuing to Seek Resolution of the Water & Coal Issues & to Establish a 
MERMA Account, Decision No. 04-12-016, at 4 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 
2, 2004) [hereinafter SCE Expenditures]. 
 27. SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 5. 
 28. See Kimberly C. Perdue, Comment, The Changing Scope of the United 
States’ Trust Duties to American Indian Tribes: Navajo Nation v. United 
States, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 488 (2009). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Charles F. Wilkinson, Home Dance, the Hopi, and Black Mesa Coal: 
Conquest and Endurance in the American Southwest, 1996 BYU L. REV. 449, 
457 (1996). 
 31. See, e.g., Perdue, supra note 28, at 488. 
 32. Id. 
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resources began.33 For the Hopi, it included a history of 
attempts at centralized government, overcoming the resistance 
to centralized government, and ultimately their reluctance to 
separate minerals from their ancestral land of 12,000 years or 
more.34 Ultimately, the Hopi’s general counsel in 1962 resolved 
territorial disputes with the Navajo and the mineral rights for 
Black Mesa, with a fifty-fifty split of coal proceeds.35 
This same general counsel then sought to negotiate deals 
with Peabody Coal that would ultimately allow coal mining and 
using water to slurry coal for the new Mohave facility.36 What 
the Hopi did not know was that their attorney was apparently 
working concurrently for Peabody Coal.37 
The royalty agreements, not surprisingly, were soon 
viewed as greatly undervalued. The Hopi received “an 
extremely low royalty rate”38 amounting to 3.335% of gross 
sales for the coal at the time, as did the Navajo, which the 
Interior Department in a later audit concluded was “little more 
than half of what the government [was then] receiving.”39 The 
lease for water was similarly underpriced.40 
While the lease agreement for coal had no reopener clause 
that the parties could invoke themselves,41 Article VI of the 
lease allowed the U.S. Interior Secretary “to adjust the royalty 
rate to a ‘reasonable’ level on the twentieth anniversary of the 
lease.”42 As that date approached, the lease now provided 
Navajo only 2% of the gross proceeds of coal sales.43 As early as 
the 1970s, Navajo began to negotiate with Peabody for a 
revision, insisting that the royalty rate be at least 12.5%, the 
                                                          
 33. See Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 450–51. 
 34. See id. at 456–58. 
 35. See Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 132 (D. Ariz. 1962) (“[S]uch 
area is a reservation for the joint use of the Hopi and Navajo Indian Tribes.”), 
aff’d, 373 U.S. 758 (1963); Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 463–64. 
 36. See Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 461–67. 
 37. Id. at 469–71. 
 38. Navajo Nation v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 217, 221 (2000), rev’d, 263 
F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 39. Wilkinson, supra note 30, at 470, 471 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Jim Richardson & John A. Farrell, Divided Opposition, in The New Indian 
Wars, DENVER POST, Nov. 21, 1983, at 19) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 40. See id. at 472. 
 41. See Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 220. 
 42. Id. at 221. 
 43. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 495 (2003). 
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minimum allowed by Congress for federal lands.44 In 1984, 
Navajo finally asked the Secretary of the Interior, Donald 
Hodel, to adjust the rate to a fair market value.45 The Bureau 
of Indian Affairs Navajo Area Director, who was delegated 
approval authority by the Secretary, decided that a fair market 
return for the coal would be 20%.46 Peabody filed an 
administrative appeal.47 
While Peabody’s appeal was pending, and apparently on 
the eve of it being denied,48 Peabody hired a lobbyist 
recommended by SCE who was a close personal friend of the 
Secretary.49 Shortly after meeting with the lobbyist, Secretary 
Hodel signed a departmental internal memorandum that the 
Court of Claims determined was prepared by Peabody, delaying 
a decision on the appeal and directing negotiations between the 
parties.50 All the Navajo knew was that the appeal was not 
being decided and that “‘someone from Washington’ had urged 
a return to the bargaining table.”51 “Facing severe economic 
pressures,” the Navajo soon capitulated and accepted the 12.5% 
royalty rate for a mine adjacent to Black Mesa they owned 
exclusively.52 It was also agreed the rate would apply to the 
Hopi and Navajo jointly-owned Black Mesa site.53 
In 1993, the Navajo and Hopi initiated litigation to set 
aside the agreement, based upon the government breaching its 
                                                          
 44. Id. at 496. 
 45. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1336 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
 46. See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 222. The United States 
Supreme Court noted that the 12.5% royalty rate, while the minimum 
required by law, is also the customary rate found in most such leases issued or 
readjusted after 1976. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 488–89. However, the 
unusual use of slurry suggests that the true market rate would have been 
higher given the plant’s isolation and its need for the Black Mesa coal. 
 47. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 222. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See, e.g., id. 
 50. Id. at 222–23. 
 51. Id. at 223. 
 52. Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d at 1328; see Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 
223–24. The negotiation also resolved the Hopi and Navajo right to tax 
Peabody separately on the coal, capping the total payments to 20.5%. Id. at 
224. However, arguably an 8% tax plus the fair royalty rate of 20% should 
have provided a total of 28.5% to the Hopi and Navajo. See id. 
 53. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 498 n.5; Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 
224. 
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trust responsibilities.54 In 1999, the Navajo filed a separate 
lawsuit claiming SCE and Peabody had illegally conspired to 
influence the federal government, among other claims.55 The 
Supreme Court twice reversed the Circuit Court in the original 
royalty case, and ultimately in 2009, it found that no applicable 
statute allowed for a money damages remedy for Hodel’s 
conduct.56 The conspiracy lawsuit, however, continued until 
2013.57 
While this litigation was percolating, environmentalists 
raised a new set of issues that would question Mohave’s 
viability.58 On February 19, 1998, Grand Canyon Trust and 
Sierra Club filed a citizen suit against Mohave’s owners 
alleging Clean Air Act violations of emission limits, compliance 
orders, and reporting requirements.59 The lawsuit requested, 
among other things, the installation of pollution control 
equipment known as scrubbers, and fabric filter dust collectors 
known as baghouses.60 
                                                          
 54. See Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 224. 
 55. See Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 269, 272 
(D.D.C. 2002). 
 56. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 287 (2009). 
 57. A settlement was reached between Navajo and SCE in August 2011. 
Press Release, Navajo Nation Dep’t of Justice, Navajo Nation, Peabody 
Energy, Salt River Project and Southern California Edison Reach Settlement 
on Navajo Royalty Litigation (Aug. 4, 2011), available at 
http://empowerblackmesa.org/press/2011_08_04_Navajo_Nation_Peabody_Rea
ch_Settlement_on_Navajo_Royalty_Litigation. Reportedly, Peabody Coal, and 
the Navajo Nation approved reopening the royalty agreement in ten years, 
with an immediate payment of $50,000,000 and a commitment by Peabody to 
provide an additional $15,000,000 in infrastructure assistance to Navajo 
communities in the mining areas over the next ten years. Press Release, 
Buckley Sandler LLP, Buckley Sandler Partner Negotiates Settlement of 
Navajo Nation’s 12-Year Royalty Litigation with Peabody Energy, Salt River 
Project & Southern California Edison (Aug. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.buckleysandler.com/news-detail/buckleysandler-partner-
negotiates-settlement-of-navajo-nations-12-year-royalty-litigation-with-
peabody-energy-salt-river-project-southern-california-edison. The agreement 
also included $10,500,000 in a disputed retroactive bonus payment, an 
agreement to make annual bonus payments of $3,500,000, scholarship 
payments for Navajo students, and a one-time bonus payment of $1,550,000. 
Id. 
 58. See Complaint at 12–17, Grand Canyon Trust, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison 
Co., No. CV-S-98-00305-LDG (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 1998). 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. at 11. 
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During this proceeding, on March 19, 1999, the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released a 
report that determined “no other single emissions source is 
likely to have as great an impact on visibility in the [Grand 
Canyon]” as Mohave.61 EPA announced that it would consider 
applying controls through a formal rulemaking pursuant to 
Clean Air Act visibility requirements.62 
In October 1999, SCE and its co-owners signed a consent 
decree agreeing to reduce emissions by installing and operating 
the requested scrubbers and baghouses.63 The consent decree 
also provided that the upgraded technology64 would not have to 
be installed if the facility ceased to operate in 2005.65 According 
to SCE, the prospect that EPA would require similar controls, 
the possible need to sell Mohave due to California’s oncoming 
energy deregulation, and the potential termination of coal and 
water rights were factors leading it to settle.66 
California was indeed launched into its ill-fated energy 
industry deregulation.67 California’s utilities were ordered to 
divest generating resources sufficiently to create an electricity 
market.68 SCE applied for permission to sell its Mohave share 
                                                          
 61. Final Project Mohave Report Fact Sheet, supra note 23; accord The 
Mohave Generating Station & Grand Canyon Visibility, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/region9/air/mohave/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
 62. See, e.g., Final Project Mohave Report Fact Sheet, supra note 23. 
 63. The terms of the consent decree were incorporated into EPA’s 
requirements for the facility. The Mohave Generating Station & Grand 
Canyon Visibility, supra note 61. 
 64. SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 3 & n.3, 4. 
 65. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 8, Grand Canyon Trust v. S. Cal. Edison 
Co., No. CV-S-98-00305-LDG (D. Nev. Dec. 17, 1999). 
 66. See Application Regarding the Future Disposition of the Mohave 
Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Data Request Set (Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n May 29, 2008) [hereinafter Data Request Set]; see also Mohave 
Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *14 (discussing the consent decree); 
Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the Distribution of SO2 
Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of Mohave 
Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 
20, 2006), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/EFILE/A/
63119.pdf. 
 67. See Alan Ramo, California’s Energy Crisis—The Perils of Crisis 
Management and a Challenge to Environmental Justice, 7 ALBANY L. ENVTL. 
OUTLOOK J. 1, 3 (2002). 
 68. See, e.g., id. 
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to an out-of-state buyer.69 Before the deal was approved, 
deregulation fell apart, and rates skyrocketed.70 The 
Commission halted the Mohave sale, fearing that Mohave’s 
cheap coal baseload electricity was too important to lose to an 
out-of-state owner outside of CPUC’s control.71 
The Hopi’s and Navajo’s support for Mohave now was 
becoming ambivalent: On the one hand, coal and water 
royalties provided 30% of the Hopi’s entire revenue, while at 
one point unemployment was hovering at 50%, with 44% of the 
Hopi families with children under eighteen living in poverty.72 
For the Navajo, Mohave generated 10%–13% of its General 
Fund, with royalties and taxes ranging from $16.7 million to 
$19.1 million per year,73 and 93% of the 270 jobs at the mine 
were held by Native Americans, almost all Navajos.74 Peabody 
reportedly asserted that the total economic benefit to the tribes 
and local communities from Mohave operations were about $83 
million annually.75 
Yet, the N-aquifer, from which 4400 acre-feet per year of 
water was drained,76 was essential to the Hopi and Navajo 
traditional life and customs: 
[T]he coal operation caused great harm to the way of life of the 
farmers because there was not enough clean water for vegetation. 
The Navajo Aquifer has been the sole source of drinking water for 
residents that live near and on the Black Mesa region . . . . 
Many ranchers and farmers have depended on the N-Aquifer 
and its ability to feed natural springs and seeps that supply water for 
livestock, general public drinking use, and cultural offering places. 
Today, due to the increase of drought and climate change, water 
is ever more important in a region that receives less than 12 inches of 
rainfall per year. Black Mesa families become economically stressed 
                                                          
 69. See In re Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) for Authority to 
Sell Its Interest in the Mohave Generation Station, Application No. 99-10-023, 
Interim Opinion, 2001 Cal. PUC LEXIS 32, at *3–5 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 
Jan. 18, 2001) [hereinafter Mohave Sale]. 
 70. See id. at *4. 
 71. See id. at *14–18 
 72. SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 27–28. 
 73. Id. at 29. 
 74. See id. at 4, 28. 
 75. See Application Regarding the Future Disposition of the Mohave 
Generating Station, Application No. 02-05-046, Supporting Testimony 
Regarding the Future Disposition of the Mohave Generating Station 1, 15 
(Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 30, 2003) [hereinafter SCE Supplemental 
Testimony]. 
 76. SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 5. 
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when drought conditions increase because their income depends on 
the health of the Navajo Aquifer to feed their livestock and 
farmlands. Black Mesa families have to drive 20 to 60 miles to haul 
water for their personal consumption and for their livestock and farm 
lands at least 3 times a week.77 
The irony, or really the tragedy, is that global warming, 
resulting in part from the burning of coal at Mohave, was 
already contributing to Southwest drought conditions.78 
All these issues collided as water and coal contracts 
expired in 2005.79 SCE entered into negotiations with the Hopi, 
Navajo, and Peabody.80 The Navajo insisted that the royalties 
litigation had to be settled,81 and the Hopi insisted that the old 
aquifer was off-limits.82 A study was commissioned examining 
a new source, the C-Aquifer.83 However, many of the N-Aquifer 
issues applied to the C-Aquifer.84 
At the same time, SCE was concerned with the long-term 
economics of the plant, given that it depended upon Colorado 
River water to operate, and its rights to that water terminated 
in 2026.85 Finally, SCE “considered that there could be a range 
possible [sic] future costs of addressing Mohave’s CO2 emission 
based upon greenhouse gas regulatory proposals under 
discussion at that time.”86 
Environmentalists, fearing that SCE may just pull the 
plug, urged the CPUC to study alternatives to Mohave’s coal 
                                                          
 77. In re Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. Regarding the Distribution of 
SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of Mohave 
Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Modified Testimony: 
Distribution of Mohave Generating Station SO2 Credit Revenues I-1, III-6 
(Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 16, 2011). 
 78. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (Thomas R. Karl, Jerry M. Melilo 
& Thomas C. Peterson eds., 2009). 
 79. See SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 2. 
 80. See id. at 5–6. 
 81. See id. at 30. 
 82. See id. at 5–6 (discussing how Hopi opposed the use of all 
groundwater). 
 83. Id. at 6–10. 
 84. SCE Supplemental Testimony, supra note 75, at 22 (“It should be 
remembered that the C-Aquifer, like the N-Aquifer, is still groundwater and 
may ultimately have similar issues, like claims on the water, that the N-
Aquifer has.”). 
 85. See SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 9; Data Request Set, supra 
note 66. 
 86. Data Request Set, supra note 66. 
2014] TRANSITIONING TO A GREEN ECONOMY 517 
 
technology.87 The CPUC agreed, requiring that “[t]he 
alternatives investigated should include options that provide 
economic stability to the Hopi Tribe and Navajo Nation, and 
where appropriate, utilize renewable resources for 
generation.”88 The study, completed in early 2006, found that 
“the solar dish and wind options have relatively low capital and 
operating costs, potentially making them an economically 
attractive alternative.”89 
The negotiations ultimately failed.90 As 2005 approached, 
SCE made a last-ditch request that the environmental 
plaintiffs extend the time limits in their consent decree, which 
they declined to do.91 SCE finally announced it was suspending 
operations at Mohave, and in June 2006, it concluded it could 
not resume operations in part because of coal and slurry water 
costs “estimated based upon the then-ongoing efforts to return 
Mohave to service including the coal and water negotiations 
with the Navajo Nation, Hopi Tribe and Peabody Western Coal 
Company.”92 SCE ultimately decided it was not cost-effective 
and decommissioned and dismantled the power plant.93 
In hindsight, it appears Mohave was doomed from the 
beginning. For years, it ran beyond its design parameters, 
resulting in an accident in 1985 killing several workers.94 It 
                                                          
 87. See SCE Expenditures, supra note 26, at 40–42. 
 88. Id. at 70. 
 89. SARGENT & LUNDY LLC, STUDY OF POTENTIAL MOHAVE 
ALTERNATIVE/COMPLEMENTARY GENERATION RESOURCES, at ES-35 (2006), 
available at http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/documents/
pl_mohaveAlternatives041306.pdf. 
 90. See Neil Young, Arizona Utility Made Effort to Save Mohave 
Generating Station, LAUGHLIN TIMES, Oct. 20, 2013, 
http://www.laughlintimes.com/articles/2013/05/29/news/local/news884.prt. 
 91. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U338E) for a Comm’n Finding That 
Its Procurement-Related & Other Operations for the Record Period January 1 
Through December 31, 2006 Complied with Its Adopted Procurement Plan, 
Application No. 07-04-001, Opinion on 2006 Energy Res. Recovery Account 
(ERRA) Proceeding, Decision No. 07-12-027, at 5–7 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 
Dec. 20, 2007). 
 92. Data Request Set, supra note 66. 
 93. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U338E) to End the Monthly 
Reporting Requirement Under Comm’n Decision 04-12-016, Application No. 
10-02-011, Decision to End S. Cal. Edison Co.’s Monthly Reporting 
Requirement Under Comm’n Decision 04-12-016, Decision No. 10-09-035, at 
1–2 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 23, 2010). 
 94. See Mohave Coal Plant Accident, supra note 22, at 462–63, 1994 Cal. 
PUC LEXIS 216, at *28. 
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used an unusual coal supply technology that left it dependent 
on troublesome coal and water rights mired in controversial 
federal/tribal politics,95 and its emissions affected one of the 
most beloved of the nation’s national parks.96 Its energy was 
cheap, 3.5 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh),97 but only if it 
avoided pollution controls installed at other coal plants, and 
only so long as it benefited from what Hopi and Navajo argued 
was a century of coal and water rights exploitation.98 
Yet, the very people claiming they had been victimized 
financially and environmentally fought to keep the plant open. 
Whether the price for coal and water was fair, it remained an 
essential part of the reservation income. It is a clear example 
that even a seriously flawed electricity resource will be difficult 
to terminate if people are economically dependent upon it. As 
the plant faced permanent closure, the idea of a “Just 
Transition” was born. 
III. THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION’S 
JUST TRANSITION CASE 
The CPUC’s consideration of Mohave’s impacts on the Hopi 
and Navajo communities began in a 2002 proceeding 
examining the potential closure of the facility.99 After extensive 
evidentiary hearings, the CPUC found that Mohave’s closing 
would have “devastating effects on the Hopi and Navajo people 
and tribes as a whole, as well as on the workers at the Mohave 
facility, at the mines and on the pipeline.”100 
Then, after Mohave closed in December 2005, the CPUC 
again considered issues related to Mohave in SCE’s general 
rate case.101 In this arcane ratemaking proceeding, a 
remarkable coalition of environmentalists and grassroots 
                                                          
 95. See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text. 
 96. Final Project Mohave Report Fact Sheet, supra note 23. 
 97. Mohave Sale, supra note 69, at *15. 
 98. See generally Young, supra note 90 (discussing the plant needing to 
upgrade to “comply with environmental regulations,” and the Native 
Americans’ concerns). 
 99. See SCE Expenditures, supra note 26. 
 100. Id. at 14. 
 101. See Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) for Authority to 
Increase Its Authorized Revenues for Elec. Serv. in 2006 & to Reflect That 
Increase in Rates, Application No. 04-12-014, Opinion on S. Cal. Edison Co.’s 
Test Year 2006 Gen. Rate Increase Request, at 1 (Cal Pub. Utils. Comm’n May 
11, 2006) [hereinafter SCE Rate Case]. 
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Native American organizations, the Just Transition Coalition 
(described more fully below) intervened to demand that the 
CPUC allocate funds from the sale of Acid Rain SO2 
allowances, which were an unneeded windfall if Mohave 
remained closed, to help transition the Hopi and Navajo 
communities to cleaner energy alternatives.102 
In response to Just Transition Coalition’s intervention, the 
CPUC required SCE to set the SO2 allowance revenues aside in 
a separate account that would be disbursed in a future 
proceeding.103 That future proceeding began in December 
2006.104 In that case, the CPUC affirmed its authority to 
disburse the revenues from the sale of Mohave’s sulfur 
allowances to help the Hopi and Navajo communities impacted 
by Mohave.105 
A. THE ACID RAIN PROGRAM ALLOWANCES AT ISSUE 
The availability of acid rain allowances provided a 
convenient funding source for the Just Transition Coalition, as 
it could for other coal-fueled power plants.106 In 1990, Congress 
enacted Title IV of the Acid Rain Program,107 which initiated a 
system of buying and trading allowances or credits for tons of SO2 
emitted by fossil-fuel facilities.108 An allowance authorizes a 
utility or industrial source to emit one ton of SO2 during a given 
year or any year thereafter.109 At the end of each year, a source 
must hold an amount of allowances at least equal to its annual 
                                                          
 102. Id. at 20 & n.16, 21; Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) for 
Authority to Increase Its Authorized Revenues for Elec. Serv. in 2006 & to 
Reflect That Increase in Rates, Application No. 04-12-014, Motion for a “Just 
Transition” in Response to Closure of the Mohave Generating Station, at 1–3 
(Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Motion for a Just 
Transition]. 
 103. SCE Rate Case, supra note 101, at 26–27 (noting that this action, 
setting aside the revenues in a separate fund, was essential for preserving the 
funding to be disbursed in a way decided in a future proceeding). 
 104. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25. 
 105. Id. at *1. 
 106. See generally CHI. CLIMATE EXCHANGE, THE SULFUR DIOXIDE 
EMISSION ALLOWANCE TRADING PROGRAM: MARKET ARCHITECTURE, MARKET 
DYNAMICS AND PRICING 5 (2004), available at http://www.ccfe.com/
education_ccfe/SO2_Background_Drivers_Pricing_PDF.pdf (discussing how 
the SO2 trading program “provides a profit incentive”). 
 107. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 917 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 108. See id. at 902. 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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emissions, e.g., a source that emits 5000 tons of SO2 must hold at 
least 5000 allowances that are usable in that year.110 However, 
regardless of how many allowances a source holds, it is never 
entitled to exceed federal emissions limits set to protect public 
health.111 Allowances are allocated to utilities without charge as 
an incentive to reduce their emissions.112 As a 56% owner of 
Mohave, SCE’s annual share of allowances until 2010 was just 
under 29,800, and, beginning in 2010, was over 29,200.113 An 
interesting aspect of the proceeding was that the allowances’ 
potential value shifted significantly from being worth hundreds 
of dollars per allowance to being worth only a few dollars at most, 
due to EPA regulatory actions and judicial rulings.114 
B. THE JUST TRANSITION COALITION AND PROPOSAL 
The Just Transition Coalition first appeared in SCE’s rate 
case.115 It was composed of a strategic alliance of 
environmental and grassroots Native American interests 
including the Indigenous Environmental Network, Black Mesa 
Trust, Black Mesa Water Coalition, To’ Nizhoni Ani, Grand 
Canyon Trust, and the Sierra Club, working with Grand 
Canyon Trust’s attorney who had extensive experience before 
the CPUC, Sara Myers.116 The Coalition’s purpose was to help 
the Navajo and Hopi communities, devastated by Mohave’s 
operation and closure, transition to a renewable energy 
economy.117 As Roger Clark of the Grand Canyon Trust, a 
founding member of the Coalition, observed: 
The best scenario would be for Edison to give up trying to keep 
Mohave open and, instead, invest in alternative energy projects and 
transmission lines that would help the Hopi and Navajo exploit their 
potentially abundant wind and solar power resources . . . . With 
                                                          
 110. See id. § 7651b(g). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See CHI. CLIMATE EXCHANGE, supra note 106, at 5. 
 113. See 40 C.F.R. § 73.10 (2012). The numbers were calculated by adding the 
“Total Annual Phase II” allowances for each boiler, and multiplying that total by 
.56 for SCE ownership percentage. 
 114. Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *27–31 (describing 
change in allowance value); cf. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 916–18 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that the EPA lacks statutory authority to arbitrarily 
reduce SO2 emissions allowances). 
 115. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *3 & n.1. 
 116. SCE Rate Case, supra note 101, at 20 n.16. The authors joined Myers 
on behalf of the Sierra Club after the initial protests were filed. 
 117. See SCE Rate Case, supra note 101, at 21. 
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California wanting to invest in cleaner forms of energy . . . why buy 
another 20 years of inefficient, old coal-fired generation?118 
When Mohave closed, the Coalition advocated for exactly 
that—investment in renewable resources that would assist the 
Navajo and Hopi communities.119 The Coalition asserted that 
this transition was equitable due to Mohave’s operation and 
closure’s devastating economic and social impacts and decades 
of what it considered subsidized cheap coal power.120 
The Coalition identified sulfur allowance revenues to fund 
this transition because the allowances were no longer needed 
after Mohave closed, and because SCE received the allowances 
for free.121 As the Coalition summarized: “After 35 years of 
running Mohave at great cost to the Navajo and Hopi, it is now 
unreasonable to permit SCE to reap hundreds of millions of 
dollars in new, unearned revenues from the sale of sulfur 
allowances as the result of SCE’s own decisions to close 
Mohave.”122 
The Coalition’s proposal recommended that the best and 
most appropriate use of the Mohave allowance proceeds was “to 
promote renewable energy development that directly benefits 
the Navajo Nation and/or the Hopi Tribe, while providing” 
electricity to California residents and ratepayers.123 To assure 
that its proposal fell within the CPUC’s authority, the Coalition 
tied its proposal to SCE’s current renewable procurement 
requirements, a process in which SCE requires proposals to 
meet the statutory renewable portfolio standard.124 It 
suggested that the allowance revenues be used as an adder to 
incentivize renewable projects in California that are owned or 
co-owned with significant ownership interest by the Hopi Tribe 
                                                          
 118. Marc Lifsher, Deal May be Near on Power Plant, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2005, articles.latimes.com/print/2005/nov/08/business/fi-mohave8 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 119. See Motion for a Just Transition, supra note 102, at 2–3. 
 120. SCE Rate Case, supra note 101, at 22. 
 121. See Motion for a Just Transition, supra note 102, at 10, 15. 
 122. Id. at 15. 
 123. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the Distribution 
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of 
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Just Transition 
Coal.’s Opening Brief, at 5–8 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Feb. 21, 2012) 
[hereinafter Opening Brief], available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/EFILE/BRIEF/160768.pdf. 
 124. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *26. 
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and/or Navajo Nation, or located on lands owned by the Hopi 
Tribe and/or Navajo Nation.125 
C. POSITIONS OF OTHER PARTIES  
The Hopi and Navajo participated in the proceeding, as did 
the utility unions and ratepayer advocates.126 Initially, the 
Hopi Tribe requested a “Mohave-suspension relief package” 
with direct financing and financial assistance to the Tribe.127 
The Navajo Nation proposed that the revenues fund renewable 
energy studies and development that benefited the Nation.128 
Neither initial proposal tied the use of the funds to SCE’s 
procurement process. By the end of the proceeding, after years 
of mediation, workshops, and litigation, the Hopi and Navajo 
proposed, similar to the Just Transition Coalition, that the 
revenues incentivize renewable energy generation pursuant to 
SCE’s procurement process that benefited their respective 
tribes.129 
Other parties participated in the proceeding. A group 
representing union workers and a non-profit representing 
ratepayers proposed that the allowances be retired.130 SCE and 
                                                          
 125. See id.; Opening Brief, supra note 123, at 5–6. 
 126. Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *2–4. 
 127. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the Distribution 
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of 
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Protest of the Hopi 
Tribe to Application of S. Cal. Co. Regarding the Distribution of SO2 
Allowance Sale Proceeds, at 5 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 31, 2007) 
[hereinafter Hopi Tribe Protest]. 
 128. See, e.g., Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the 
Distribution of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended 
Operation of Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Navajo 
Nation Proposal for Allocation of the Proceeds from the Sale of SO2 Credits 
Resulting from the Shutdown of Mohave Generating Station, at 1 (Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/EFILE/REPORT/104886.PDF. 
 129. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *23–26. 
 130. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U338E) Regarding the Distribution 
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of 
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Admin. Law Judge’s 
Ruling on Treatment of Proceeds from Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Sales by S. 
Cal. Edison Co., at 13 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter ALJ 
Ruling], available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/EFILE/
RULINGS/133248.pdf. 
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the CPUC’s Division of Ratepayer Advocates proposed that the 
allowances revenues be returned directly back to ratepayers.131 
D. THE CPUC’S LEGAL AUTHORITY AND FINAL DECISION 
Although there was precedent for the CPUC considering 
community impacts from utilities,132 using sulfur allowances to 
benefit out-of-state non-ratepayers was novel. Thus, the CPUC 
initially conducted a mediation to see if a resolution could be 
reached.133 Although those efforts failed, the Coalition’s 
position started to coalesce with the Hopi and Navajo 
positions.134 Since the case presented a matter of first 
impression, the CPUC initially examined its legal authority to 
disburse the allowance revenues under the California 
Constitution, the California Public Utilities Code, and federal 
law,135 as well as California’s more recent requirements under 
its renewable energy portfolio standard.136 
The California Constitution and statutory authorities give 
the CPUC broad authority to regulate the public utilities of the 
State.137 This authority includes the ability to act in a 
supervisory and regulatory manner to do all things “which are 
necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction.”138 This supervisory and regulatory power has been 
construed liberally to allow the CPUC broad power to regulate 
utilities within its jurisdiction.139 As part of its broad authority, 
the CPUC has the authority to exercise equitable jurisdiction as 
                                                          
 131. Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *32–33. 
 132. See Application of Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. for Authorization to Sell the El 
Dorado Hydroelectric Project to El Dorado Irrigation Dist. Pursuant to Pub. 
Utils. Code Section 851, Application No. 98-04-016, Opinion, 1999 Cal. PUC 
LEXIS 677, at *1–2 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 16, 1999). 
 133. See Just Transition Coalition Wins Request for Formal Mediation 
from CPUC, NAVAJO-HOPI OBSERVER (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.navajohopiobserver.com/main.asp?SectionID=29&SubSectionIS=4
1&ArticleID=5693&TM=30930.23. 
 134. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *4–6. 
 135. See ALJ Ruling, supra note 130, at 15–16. 
 136. See id. at 29. 
 137. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 6 (“The commission may fix rates, 
establish rules, . . . and prescribe a uniform system of accounts for all public 
utilities subject to its jurisdiction.”). 
 138. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 2012). 
 139. See Wise v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 482 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999) (“[T]he PUC . . . [has] broad regulatory power over public 
utilities . . . .”). 
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an incident to its express duties and consistent with its 
regulation of public utilities and established legal principles.140 
For example, the CPUC can issue injunctions, create constructive 
trusts, reform contracts, and issue cease and desist orders.141 In 
particular, “[w]here necessary, the Commission may attach 
conditions to a transaction in order to protect and promote the 
public interest.”142 
The CPUC’s authority can be limited only by express 
direction or statutory enactment of the California Legislature.143 
SCE and the CPUC’s Division of Ratepayer Advocates argued 
that the CPUC’s authority to award allowance proceeds to a third 
party was limited by rate refund requirements.144 Rate refunds 
are “specific amounts held by utilities as rebates from their 
suppliers and earmarked for customer ‘refunds’ by prior 
commission orders and utility tariffs.”145 To qualify as a rate 
refund, three requirements must be met: (1) the funds to be 
refunded must have been previously collected in rates from 
ratepayers; (2) the funds must be previously ordered to be 
refunded by a regulatory agency; and (3) the refunds must be 
made to the customers who paid higher rates, to the extent 
practical.146 The CPUC found that none of these criteria were 
satisfied because the allowance revenues were not held or 
collected as rates, the allowances were not previously ordered 
refunded, and the ratepayers did not pay for the allowances.147 
The CPUC also examined whether it had regulatory 
authority to allocate the allowance revenues to promote 
renewable development.148 The CPUC relied upon California’s 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) program, which mandates 
                                                          
 140. See, e.g., id. at 487. 
 141. Id.; Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 25 
Cal. 3d 891, 907 (Cal. 1979); see also W. San Martin Water Works, Inc. v. San 
Martin Cnty. Water Dist., 71 Cal. Pub. Util. Rptr. 75, 85 (1997) (discussing how 
the CPUC may “exercise equitable powers in aid of jurisdiction specifically 
conferred upon it . . . . Restoration of the status quo is within these powers”). 
 142. In re Citizens Telecomm. Co. of Cal., 210 Cal. Pub. Util. Rptr. 4th 189, 
236 (2001); accord CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 851 (West 2012). 
 143. See Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 62 Cal. 2d 634, 
650, 653 (Cal. 1965). 
 144. See, e.g., ALJ Ruling, supra note 130, at 16 (summarizing SCE’s and 
DRA’s arguments). 
 145. Cal. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 24 Cal. 3d 836, 845 (Cal. 1979). 
 146. See id. at 839–40; ALJ Ruling, supra note 130, at 17–18. 
 147. ALJ Ruling, supra note 130, at 17–18. 
 148. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *39–40. 
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that load-serving entities including SCE achieve a target of 
meeting 33% of their customer demand with renewable electric 
generation by 2020.149 
Other authorities supported this approach, although the 
CPUC did not rely upon them. For instance, the Federal Clean 
Air Act provides that one of its purposes is “to encourage 
energy conservation, use of renewable and clean alternative 
technologies.”150 The California Public Utilities Code also 
recognizes the interest of the State to improve economically-
disadvantaged conditions for minorities, including Native 
Americans151 by increasing procurement of renewable 
energy.152 California Public Utilities Code further provides that 
preference should be given for “renewable energy projects that 
provide environmental and economic benefits to communities 
afflicted with poverty or high unemployment, or that suffer 
from high emission levels of toxic air contaminants, criteria air 
pollutants, and greenhouse gases.”153 
After reviewing its authority, the CPUC determined that: 
The Commission’s role as a utility regulatory agency is . . . the 
touchstone in evaluating the parties’ proposals for disposition of the 
SO2 allowance proceeds. . . . [T]he Commission’s options for 
allocating the SO2 allowance proceeds are limited to those that are 
connected to the Commission’s ongoing regulation of California 
public utilities and that may be implemented under the 
Commission’s supervision.154 
Under these principles, the CPUC found that it had 
authority to disburse the allowance revenues to incentivize 
renewable generation that benefited Hopi and Navajo 
communities.155 The CPUC then considered the equity issues and 
found that “[i]n view of the history of Mohave and the 
Commission’s long-standing concern for the consequences of its 
closure, it is reasonable to use the SO2 allowance proceeds to 
benefit the Hopi Tribe and the Navajo Nation, as well as SCE 
customers.”156 To accomplish this, the CPUC created a revolving 
                                                          
 149. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11 (West 2012). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. §7651(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 151. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8282(b) (West 2012). 
 152. Id. § 8281(b)(1)(D)–(E). 
 153. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.13(a)(7). 
 154. ALJ Ruling, supra note 130, at 15–16. 
 155. See Mohave Sulfur Allowances, supra note 25, at *18. 
 156. Id. at *39. 
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fund that would utilize the revenues for deposits required as part 
of the renewable procurement process.157 
“The Navajo Nation applaud[ed] the [CPUC] for crafting an 
equitable solution that would provide economic benefits to the 
tribes and mitigate the devastating effects of the closure of the 
Mohave Generating Station . . . .”158 The Hopi Tribe called the 
decision “the most sound and equitable approach for all affected 
parties.”159 The Just Transition Coalition supported the decision 
stating that “[t]he devastation that Mohave’s operation and 
closure caused to the Navajo and Hopi communities warrant this 
result.”160 
E. IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISION 
Beyond its immediate impact in facilitating future Hopi and 
Navajo renewable energy development, the CPUC’s decision 
presents a roadmap for other states to consider creative solutions 
to help communities transition away from fossil-fuel generation. 
The facts in another case are unlikely to be the same as the 
Mohave case, but it demonstrates how a community’s history and 
circumstances may establish an equitable case supporting 
remediation. It may in fact be easier to justify the expenditure of 
even greater ratepayer funds for transition if the impacted 
communities are within the state and are themselves ratepayers. 
                                                          
 157. Id. at *39–40. 
 158. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the Distribution 
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of 
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Comments of the 
Navajo Nation on Proposed Decision Determining Treatment of Sale Proceeds 
of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances from Mohave Generating Station, at 1 (Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n Feb. 4, 2013), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M042/K159/42159470.pdf. 
 159. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U338E) Regarding the Distribution 
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of 
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Hopi Tribe’s 
Comments on the Proposed Decision Determining Treatment of Sale Proceeds 
of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances from Mohave Generating Station, at 2 (Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n Feb. 5, 2013), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M049/K629/49629398.pdf. 
 160. Application of S. Cal. Edison Co. (U 338-E) Regarding the Distribution 
of SO2 Allowance Sale Proceeds Related to the Suspended Operation of 
Mohave Generating Station, Application No. 06-12-022, Just Transition Coal. 
Comments on the Proposed Decision Determining Treatment of Sale Proceeds 
of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances from Mohave Generating Station, at 5 (Cal. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n Feb. 4, 2013), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/
PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M042/K157/42157387.pdf. 
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State public utility commissions161 throughout the country 
can craft similar creative solutions.162 Similar to the CPUC, other 
State Public Utility Commissions generally have broad power to 
consider the public interest in their regulation of utilities.163 Also 
similar to the CPUC, the only limitation to this broad authority is 
generally specific, enumerated statutory exceptions.164 Further, 
the majority of states have some type of renewable standard,165 
which means that encouraging development of renewable energy 
should be within the relevant state agency’s jurisdiction.166 
CONCLUSION 
The CPUC’s creative approach provides a framework for 
considering how to transition a community away from fossil 
fuel generation. Other state utility commissions have similar 
authority as the CPUC, and creative disbursements like this 
can provide the necessary incentive to spur critical green 
development in impacted areas. Consideration of the equities, 
as the CPUC has illustrated, can be done consistent with an 
agency’s jurisdictional authorities in a way that does not 
undercut ratepayer or other potential interests. 
                                                          
 161. State agencies that regulate utilities have many different names such 
as public utility commissions, corporation commissions, or public service 
commissions. 
 162. See, e.g., Victory for Clean Air as Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission Orders Otter Tail Power to Stop Burning Coal at Hoot Lake Coal 
Plant by 2020, FRESH ENERGY (Jan. 31, 2013), http://fresh-
energy.org/2013/01/news-release-victory-for-clean-air-as-minnesota-public-
utilities-commission-orders-otter-tail-power-to-stop-burning-coal-at-hoot-lake-
coal-plant-by-2020/. 
 163. See generally FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 46–51 (Foundation Press 3d ed. 2010) (discussing Munn v. 
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877)); 14 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §6674.30 (2012) (discussing how 
public utility commissions have authority that “extends to the making of 
orders generally applicable to the service to be provided by the public 
service . . . as the public interest may from time to time require”). 
 164. See FLETCHER, supra note 163, § 6674.30; 29 CORPUS JURIS 
SECUNDUM ELECTRICITY § 56 (2013); see also 27A AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
§ 149 (2d ed. 1996) (“A state statute may provide the exclusive method for 
regulating electric utilities in that state.”). 
 165. Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE ST. INCENTIVES FOR 
RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (Mar. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/
summarymaps/RPS_map.pdf. 
 166. Analyzing a state agency’s jurisdiction would be done on a case-by-
case basis. 
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